

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON

JUL 19 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: General Walter Bedell Smith  
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Evaluation - Test Case

In accordance with the views of Board members expressed at the meeting of June 12, I am submitting the attached proposals for carrying out a "test case" evaluation of the effectiveness of our national psychological operations.

It will be seen that two alternatives are presented in detail: [redacted]

The staff is prepared to begin work immediately on either of these.

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If, for any reason, the Board felt it were desirable, the staff would be equally ready to apply the same general procedure outlined in the accompanying proposals to [redacted] [redacted] combined); to [redacted] or to [redacted]. In my opinion, all of these are important areas, and should be the object of PSB evaluations as soon as practicable.

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While fully prepared to tackle any of these which the Board might select, it is our recommendation that we start with [redacted] as the first "test" evaluation.

In arriving at this recommendation, the following major factors were taken into account:

1. The special interest expressed in [redacted] at the last Board meeting.

2. The urgency of the case, arising from the relative nearness (next Spring) of general elections in [redacted]

3. The fact that the United States has made a major and varied psychological effort there.

4. PSB has completed and put into effect a plan for the attainment of certain objectives in [redacted], which is now in the early stages of implementation.

5. By a process of elimination: While Germany and Japan were both considered to be important and urgent areas for evaluation, they are both special cases due to the presence of large numbers of

Dr. [redacted] 1tr  
Evaluation - Test Case


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
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American troops there and the fact that both are just now emerging from Occupation status; South East Asia - and in particular Indo China - is certainly second to no other area in importance and urgency, but the problem there is greatly complicated by the number of governments involved

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Director

Enclosures (2):

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1. R-138 [ ] (Rev.) 6/25/52 "Proposed 'Test Case'  
Evaluation of U. S. Psychological Operations [ ]

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2. R-141 [ ] (Rev.) 6/25/52 "Proposed 'Test Case'  
Evaluation of U. S. Psychological Operations [ ]

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

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